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Consent Decrees Under the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization
Act of 1986:
Controlling Discretion With Procedure
In 1986, Congress passed the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act ("SARA")' in order to restructure the Com-
prehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability
Act ("CERCLA"), commonly known as "Superfund,"2 and to curb
what it perceived to be the Environmental Protection Agency's
("EPA") abuse of its discretion in administering the Fund.3 One of
the ways in which the bill sought to accomplish these ends was to
require the use of consent decrees in waste-site cleanups by the
polluter.
This comment will argue (1) that the mandatory use of con-
sent decrees for all private cleanups is unworkable (Part III); and
(2) that Congress should have at the very least bifurcated the
Superfund settlement process into two stages-one pertaining to
' Public L. No. 99-499, 100 stat. 1613, reprinted in 1986 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News 2835, amending the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Li-
ability Act of 1980, codified primarily at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982 and Supp. 1985). This
comment will refer to the provisions as amended by SARA, which are in many instances
substantively similar to the original provisions, unless the context demands otherwise.
2 Although the terms "Superfund" and "CERCLA" are often used interchangeably,
CERCLA in fact embraces a much broader range of administrative mechanisms than simple
federal cleanups financed by the Fund.
3The EPA misconduct in the early administration of Superfund is documented pri-
marily in Environmental Protection Agency Investigation of Superfund and Agency
Abusesi-Parts 1-3: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of
the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) ("Oversight
and Investigations Subcommittee Report").
According to William N. Hedeman, Jr., Director of EPA's Office of Emergency and Re-
medial Response from 1981 to 1985, the EPA attempted to spend as little of the Fund
monies as possible to prevent future reauthorization of Superfund when it expired in
1985-even to the point of relaxing its cleanup standards in order to prompt generators of
hazardous waste to agree to remove waste through settlements: "[Tihere was a hidden
agenda if you will, not to set into motion events that would lead to ... the extension of the
[CERCLA] tax or reenactment of the law beyond the 1985 cutoff." Id., Part 2 at 160. See
also Former EPA Officials Said to Curtail Superfund Spending to Retain Current Law, 13
Env't Rep. (BNA) 2307, 2307-08 (1983).
The political controversy surrounding this and other EPA fundings resulted in the res-
ignation or firing of fifteen officials at that time, including EPA Administrator Anne Gor-
such and her assistant administrator, Rita Lavelle.
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surface waste removals, and one pertaining to underground reme-
dial actions. Because the former stage may be conducted more effi-
ciently by private parties, and since the latter is much more open
to industry manipulation due to the unforeseeability of cleanup
costs, Congress should have required only those settlements per-
taining to underground decontamination to be entered as consent
decrees (Part IV). In reaching these positions, the comment will
also discuss the problems which plagued the administration of
CERCLA in its early years (Part I) and the relevant sections of
SARA designed to curb agency discretion through the mandatory
use of consent decrees (Part II).
I. EPA SWEETHEART DEALS-AN EXAMPLE
CERCLA was enacted in 1980 to give the EPA clear authority
and funding to respond to the serious environmental and public
health hazards posed by hazardous waste sites prior to adjudicated
findings of liability.4 By 1983, the program was in serious jeopardy.
The agency had begun to substitute its own agenda for hazardous
waste enforcement for that set by Congress. Its tactics ranged from
refusals to use Superfund monies for hazardous waste removal to
granting industry-requested delays in conducting cleanups.
The height of the EPA-generated Superfund controversy came
in late 1982, when the agency entered into a series of so-called
"sweetheart" deals which, critics charged, unduly favored industry
" CERCLA, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News
6119, 6119-20. The original CERCLA did not dictate substantive guidelines regarding, for
example, legally acceptable levels of hazardous wastes. Rather, it provided the administra-
tive framework for the enforcement of the simple but ineffective Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act ("RCRA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982 and Supp. 1985).
Despite Congress's original intention that CERCLA be the comprehensive response to
the problem of hazardous waste disposal, it was clear by 1980 that the statute simply could
not fulfill this promise. Although it did regulate the "cradle-to-grave" handling of hazardous
wastes by generator, transporter, and facility site owner, it failed: (1) to address past dump-
ing practices; (2) to provide for removal of present hazardous wastes; (3) to require that
hazardous waste generators use the most efficient and effective methods to dispose of waste;
(4) to provide funds for emergency waste containment or removal procedures; and (5) to
preempt the approaches of nonuniform states to the determination of siting of waste
disposal facilities. Note, The Role of Injunctive Relief and Settlements in Superfund En-
forcement, 68 Cornell L. Rev. 706, 709-10 (1983) ("Role of Injunctive Relief").
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polluters.5 For example, in the Seymour Recycling decree,' 24 of
the 364 polluters (those 24 accounted for half of the total chemi-
cals at the waste site) proposed to conduct their own cleanup of
surface waste material at the site at an estimated cost of $7.7 mil-
lion in exchange for the EPA's promise not to sue for any further
cleanup costs.' The EPA offered a "cash-out" proposal to the re-
maining 340 generators whereby they paid directly to the EPA
their pro rata share of the $15 million targeted for underground
decontamination.
After the EPA published the terms of the first agreement for
public review as required by Department of Justice ("DOJ") regu-
lations,' the 340 "secondary" generators objected to the consent
5 In particular, the EPA settled with Seymour Recycling Company in Indiana, General
Disposal in California, and Chem-Dyne Corporation in Ohio during this time. Critics
charged that these settlements were nothing more than "sweetheart" deals made in order to
prevent the straining of relations with larger corporate PRPs ("potentially responsible par-
ties"). Largest Voluntary Cleanup Settlement Announced for Seymour Site Under
Superfund, 13 Env't Rep. (BNA) 877, 877-78 (Oct. 29, 1982).
One observer has suggested, however, that at least one "sweetheart" settlement merely
appeared to favor industry PRPs due to inflated cost figures. Bernstein, The Enviro-Chem
Settlement: Superfund Problem-Solving, 13 Env't L. Rep. (Env't L. Inst.) 10402, 10403 n.7.
Another individual has stated that United States v. Seymour Recycling Corp., 554 F. Supp.
1334 (S.D. Ind. 1982), case was precipitated by the State of Indiana's inability to provide
50% of the cleanup funds, as was required by 42 U.S.C.A. § 9604(c)(3) (West Supp. 1987)
for previously state-owned facilities such as the Seymour site. Letter from William N.
Hedeman, former director of Superfund, May 27, 1987 (on file with the University of Chi-
cago Legal Forum).
6 Seymour Recycling, 554 F. Supp. at 1335.
7 The terms of the covenant not to sue read as follows:
The United States, the State and the local governments do hereby covenant not to
sue, execute judgment, or take any civil judicial or administrative action under
[any law] . . . against the Companies ... arising out of or related to the storage,
treatment, handling, disposal, transportation or presence or actual or threatened
release or discharge of any materials at, to, from or near the Seymour site, includ-
ing any action with respect to surface cleanup and soil or groundwater cleanup
at the Seymour site. This covenant. . . includes all civil, legal and administrative
costs incurred by the United States, the State and the local governments ....
Seymour Recycling, 554 F. Supp. at 1346 (from Section XII of consent decree) (emphasis
added).
The covenant not to sue also covered all additional costs "relating to injury to, destruc-
tion of, or loss of natural resources of the United States .... Id. Compare with 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 9607(a)(4)(A)-(D) (West Supp. 1987) (explicitly imposing such costs on polluters).
' The relevant regulations provide that the DOJ may enter into a consent decree "to
enjoin discharges of pollutants into the environment" only after DOJ gives public notice of
the terms of the decree, with thirty days allowed for the filing of objections with the Depart-
ment. 28 C.F.R. 50.7(a)-(b) (1986).
Despite the EPA's compliance with this particular DOJ regulation during the early
1980s, the EPA in fact bypassed many DOJ requirements by entering into informal talks
with industry PRPs without involving DOJ attorneys. Theoretically, the DOJ is the legal
representative for the EPA in all Superfund negotiations and litigation, once the EPA initi-
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decree as an unfair allocation of monetary liability between the
two groups: one group, responsible for half the contamination, paid
only $7.7 million, while the other group was to pay $15 million.
The district court rejected this argument, citing the twenty-four
polluters' continued responsibility for any surface cleanup costs
above the original $7.7 million.9
More important, however, is the fact that the district court
upheld the reasonableness of the consent decree without once ex-
pressing any reservations over its inclusion of the extremely broad
covenant not to sue for any future costs of eliminating under-
ground contamination of the site.I" This covenant essentially re-
leased the polluters from responsibility for any unexpected costs
above and beyond the $15 million originally scheduled for the un-
derground cleanup. The agreement was particularly problematic in
light of the special environmental and financial problems posed by
hazardous wastes which seep below the surface of a site. Not only
do they present tremendous threats to the quality of drinking
water obtained from' underground aquifers, but the amount of
funding needed to avert this threat is highly volatile. Some of the
costs of conducting subsurface hazardous waste cleanups are often
subject to change, others are virtually unenforceable, due to the
inability to identify and locate all the responsible parties, and all
ates an enforcement action against a PRP. By commencing such an action, the EPA thus
invokes the additional procedural safeguards required under DOJ guidelines. However, dur-
ing the early 1980s, the EPA attempted to enter into extensive informal talks with some
PRPs without actually commencing an enforcement action, thus avoiding DOJ involvement
until the final signing of a settlement agreement. Telephone conversation with Robert V.
Percival, formerly Senior Attorney, Environmental Defense Fund, Sept. 14, 1987.
9 The defendants' contract with the waste disposal firm chosen to carry out the surface
cleanup, Chemical Waste Management, provided that the latter was responsible for the
completion of the work regardless of its ultimate cost over $7.7 million. Seymour Recycling,
554 F. Supp. at 1336.
"o The district court instead focused on the need for an immediate cleanup of the site.
It was concerned with the "immediate, substantial endangerment to public health"
presented by the 60,000 toxic waste barrels located on the surface of the site, id. at 1340,
and concluded that the decree was fair and adequate due to its potential for immediately
initiating cleanup operations at the site. "In reaching this determination, the Court has par-
ticularly considered the need to abate the hazardous conditions at the site as expeditiously
as possible and the unavailability of any other prompt plan to undertake the cleanup." Id.
at 1341.
The court was prompted by the EPA's inability to effectuate the cleanup itself at that
time. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9604(c)(3) (West Supp. 1987) requires the state in which the waste site
is located to provide matching funds before the EPA may commit federal Superfund monies
for a cleanup. The State of Indiana, however, had not yet established a state Superfund in
1982, and did not expect to be able to provide the matching funds until almost one year
later. Seymour Recycling, 554 F. Supp. at 1340. See also note 5.
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are extremely difficult to estimate a priori.11
The court's approval of and the EPA's willingness to enter
into such a pro-industry release of liability for future underground
decontamination costs created an immediate uproar among envi-
ronmental groups.12 The covenant not to sue for underground de-
contamination relieved the industry polluters of all the risks of re-
sponsibility for these future unquantifiable costs without incurring
any increased present liability. Consequently, environmentalists
complained that the EPA had compromised its duty to ensure full
cleanup of the Seymour site and subjected itself to excessive re-
sponsibility for future cleanup costs as an expensive tradeoff to get
industry polluters to conduct part of the cleanup themselves.
II. CONTROLLING SWEETHEART DEALS-THE CERCLA
AMENDMENTS
A. The Administrative Framework
Under CERCLA, the EPA may effectuate the removal of haz-
ardous wastes in one of two principal ways: the agency, pursuant to
Section 9604, may clean up the site itself (an "agency cleanup")1 3 ;
or, pursuant to Section 9606, it may order potentially responsible
parties ("PRPs") to remove the hazardous waste material (a "pri-
11 By 1984, the U.S. General Accounting Office ("GAO") had issued a report describing
the hidden costs of underground cleanup, stating that the EPA's failure to include them in
its assessment of the financial needs of the Superfund program rendered the EPA estimates
unreliable. Superfund Projections May Not Be Reliable, Exclude Groundwater Cleanup
Costs, GAO Says, 14 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1943 (Mar. 9, 1984).
On April 2, 1986, the American Insurance Association released a study indicating that
the cost needed to contain the effects of existing hazardous waste at a site under the new
cleanup standards would average $24.1 million (compared with EPA estimates of $9.2 mil-
lion), and that permanent cleanups would average $34.7 million per site (compared with
EPA estimates of $6.3 million). Cleanup Standards of House Superfund Bill Would Increase
Costs Five-fold, Study Says, 16 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2156 (April 4, 1986). Others have esti-
mated the permanent underground cleanup costs at $300-$600 million per site. High Cost of
Permanent Superfund Cleanups to Result in Interim Actions, 17 Env't Rep. (BNA) 778,
778-79 (Sept. 26, 1986) (interview with Gene Lucero, director of EPA's Office of Waste Re-
source Management).
'2 The widespread disapproval of the perceived pro-industry bias in Superfund admin-
istration reached such heights that within ten months, the House Committee on Public
Works and Transportation arranged to investigate the events leading up to the negotiation
and approval of the agreements which appeared to favor potential corporate defendants. See
generally Hazardous Waste Contamination of Water Resources (Superfund Clean-up Policy
and the Seymour Recycling Case), Hearings before the Subcommittee on Investigations and
Oversight of the House Committee on Public Works and Transportation, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1983 and 1984).
13 42 U.S.C.A. § 9604(a) (West Supp. 1987).
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vate cleanup"). 14 If the EPA performs the cleanup, it initially
utilizes Superfund money to do so, but cost-sharing arrangements
are also made with the particular state. 5 Subsequent to such a
cleanup, the EPA may recoup the cost from PRPs under the rules
of liability established by Section 9607 of CERCLA.' 6
CERCLA, as it stood in 1980, contained little statutory guid-
ance governing the administration of the Superfund program. No
provisions existed to limit the EPA's discretion to enter into one-
sided settlement agreements with PRPs to conduct cleanups.
There were also no provisions which consistently allowed third
parties to comment on whether a proposed course of action would
satisfy concerns of industry, of the EPA, of interested citizens or
for the public health in general."
"' 42 U.S.C.A. § 9606 (West Supp. 1987). The most important provision of the section is
subpart (a). It outlines the two instances in which a PRP may be enjoined from depositing
new toxic wastes at a site, or required to clean up materials which the PRP improperly
disposed of in the past. First, the President (in practical terms, the EPA Administrator)
may seek a court-ordered injunction when he or she determines that there may be an "im-
minent and substantial" endangerment to the public health or welfare or the environment
because of an actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance from a facility. Id. at
§ 9606(a). Second, the President may "take other action under this section including, but
not limited to, issuing such orders as may be necessary to protect the public health and
welfare and the environment." Id.
The proper construction of the scope of Section 9606 has been the subject of much
debate since CERCLA's passage in 1980. Compare Carol L. Dorge, After "Voluntary Liabil-
ity": The EPA's Implementation of Superfund, 11 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 443 (1984); Note,
68 Cornell L. Rev. 706 (cited in note 4) (arguing for a narrow construction of the provision,
and thus a broad construction of Section 9604) with Neil Clark, Section 106 of CERCLA: An
Alternative to Superfund Liability, 12 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 381 (1985) (arguing for a
broad construction of Section 9606).
'- 42 U.S.C.A. § 9604(c) (West Supp. 1987). For example, unless there is a continuing
emergency, the EPA cannot spend more than $1 million until the affected state agrees to
contribute ' minimum sum and makes a commitment to find a place for uncovered hazard-
ous materials. The state must also assure future maintenance of the site and the availability
of an acceptable disposal facility. Id.
16 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a) (West Supp. 1987). Section 9607(a) provides that all parties
contributing to hazardous waste sites shall be liable for all removal or remedial costs in-
curred by the United States in a waste removal action, all necessary response costs incurred
by other related parties, plus all consequential damages to the natural resources surround-
ing the waste site. Id. Section 9607(c) also provides for a treble damage remedy against any
defendant who, "without sufficient cause," violates an agency administrative order requiring
the party either to clean up a site or reimburse the Fund for conducting a cleanup. 42
U.S.C.A. § 9607(c) (West Supp. 1987).
Liability for the cost of cleanups under CERCLA is "strict joint and several." Super-
fund Amendments of 1985, H.R. Rep. No. 99-253, Part 3, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1985).
Also, the courts may use relaxed causation requirements to find liability under Section 9607.
New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985).
17 Representative James Florio, in his article describing Congress's view of the legisla-
ture's role in CERCLA, cited two revealing statements in CERCLA's legislative history con-
cerning the amount of discretion granted the EPA in 1980:
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In response to some of these problems, the EPA adopted an
enforcement policy which has been relatively successful in the last
few years."' However, the agency continued primarily to rely on
private settlements to enforce CERCLA; by 1985, it had still nego-
tiated more toxic waste removals by private parties than it had
performed itself or had compelled by judicial action. 19 Such reli-
ance on settlement was necessary due to the great cost of agency
cleanups relative to agency resources, coupled with delays in ob-
taining compensation for the cleanups themselves. This continued
reliance on private remedial actions, unchecked by statutory safe-
guards, did nothing to assuage Congressional fears that the EPA
might once again fall prey to interest group pressures. 20 Conse-
quently, by 1985, a consensus formed demanding that Congress set
up a regulatory system restraining much of the agency's indepen-
dent powers to formulate and enter into hazardous waste settle-
ments with industry PRPs.
Congressman David Stockman warned of an "undirected regulatory blunderbuss":
The bill prescribes drastic overkill and resource waste in three separate
dimensions: inventory requirements, monitoring, and clean-up . . .
[C]lean-up methods and costs are wide open and authority to order and
directly fund cleanup is plenary, rather than limited to cases of immi-
nent threat to public health.
Senator Jesse Helms, the most active critic of the Senate version of the legislation, also
protested:
[W]e are going far beyond what is needed to address the real prob-
lem-that of abandoned waste sites. I am concerned that the addi-
tion of this whole "release" concept will unnecessarily open the
"Pandora's box" of new regulations and notice require-
ments-requirements which will not assist in the cost-effective
cleanup of waste sites but that will in addition merely provide jobs
for more bureaucrats at the expense of the consumers of America.
James J. Florio, Congress as Reluctant Regulator: Hazardous Waste Policy in the 1980's, 3
Yale J. Reg. 351, 357 (1986) (footnotes omitted).
18 In order to begin the hazardous-waste removal process, the EPA must first place the
site in question on the National Priorities List ("NPL"). This in turn triggers an assignment
of the site to the Fund itself (if it appears that a Section 9604 cleanup is most appropriate)
or to the regional enforcement personnel (if a Section 9606 or negotiated cleanup appears
most appropriate). The regional branch then sends notice letters to all identified PRPs at
the site and simultaneously conducts a Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study ("RI/FS")
to determine the likely extent of damage and the approximate cost of cleanup.
Once notice letters have been sent and the RI/FS has begun, the PRPs generally form a
committee to represent the diverse parties implicated in the contamination. The EPA then
sends out a second notice letter, informally known as a "drop dead" letter, notifying the
PRPs that they have sixty days to reach an acceptable negotiating position; otherwise the
EPA either will clean up the site itself or force them to clean it up involuntarily through the
use of an administrative order or a lawsuit.
'9 See Frederick R. Anderson, Negotiation and Informal Agency Action: The Case of
Superfund, 1985 Duke LJ. 261, 269.
20 See Florio, 3 Yale J. Reg. at 371-75 (cited in note 17).
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B. The Statutory Mechanism
One glance at the breadth and complexity of the Superfund
Amendment and Reauthorization Act of 1986 reveals the strength
of Congress's resolve to control the EPA's prosecutorial discretion
by shifting the locus of Superfund administration away from the
agency and by increasing the role of Congress, the courts, and the
public at large. Congress sought to resolve the problem of agency
discretion by placing literally dozens of procedural and substantive
checks on each stage of the CERCLA enforcement process. Con-
gress attempted to control the agency better by allowing the con-
tinued use of private cleanups while closely monitoring their use
through a variety of mechanisms designed to ensure that these pri-
vate remedies would be carried out in the public interest.
The amendments increase the availability of private cleanups
when a PRP is willing and able to conduct a proper cleanup of a
waste site.2 They also eliminate the requirement that the environ-
mental hazard addressed by the consent decree be both "imminent
and substantial. ' 22 The legislative history of SARA does not shed
much light on the rationale for these shifts,2' but one passage from
the 1980 CERCLA proceedings illustrates the rationale underlying
21 One specific example of Congress's intent to shift the focus of Superfund enforce-
ment may be found in the changes made in Section 9604(a). The early version of the section
authorized the EPA to conduct its own Fund cleanups under certain conditions, "unless the
President [i.e., the EPA administrator] determines that such removal and remedial action
will be done properly" by a responsible party. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a) (1980) (emphasis added).
In 1985, H.R. 2817 struck the "unless" clause and provided that the EPA "shall re-
quire" the responsible party to carry out the removal or remedial action in accordance with
Section 9622 (which in turn requires that the settlement be pursued through a consent de-
cree). The accompanying committee report stated, "[tihe intent is to encourage response
actions by owners or operators where the Administrator of EPA determines that they can
perform the actions properly and promptly." Superfund Amendments of 1985, H.R. Rep.
No. 99-253 Part 5, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1985).
The final version of the bill retreated from the force of H.R. 2817. H.R. 2005 also struck
the "unless" clause, but provided that the EPA "may allow" a responsible party to clean up
a site, if the EPA determines that the cleanup would be conducted "properly and
promptly." 42 U.S.C.A. § 9604(a)(1) (West Supp. 1987).
22 42 U.S.C.A. § 9622(d)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1987). For the language of this section, see
text at note 34.
23 The committee reports on these sections merely describe the changes in the statu-
tory language, with little if any elaboration on the point. See H.R. Rep. No. 99-253 at 8
(cited in note 21); Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Conference
Report, H.R. Rep. No. 99-962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 189 (1986).
The EPA informally advocated the use of consent decrees during the debate over
SARA, but was countered by industry lobbyists who were concerned that their use would
require a finding of an "imminent and substantial" threat and subject them to potential
toxic tort actions. As a compromise, the "imminent and substantial" requirement was elimi-
nated. Letter from William N. Hedeman, Jr. (cited in note 5).
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Congress' desire to encourage private sector responses to the prob-
lem of hazardous waste removal:
The supposition of the Administration's proposal [favor-
ing private party cleanups] is that society should not
bear the costs of protecting the public from hazards pro-
duced in the past by a generator, transporter, consumer,
or dumpsite owner or operator who has profited or other-
wise benefitted from commerce involving these sub-
stances and now wishes to be insulated from any continu-
ing responsibilities for the present hazards to society that
have been created. To relieve industry of responsibility
for chemicals whose effects only become visible years
later, is to sentence our children's society to a potentially
enormous burden. Relieving industry of responsibility es-
tablishes a precedent seriously adverse to the public in-
terest. It tells polluters and others who introduce hazard-
ous substances into our society and environment for
profit that the longer it takes for resultant problems to
appear-regardless of their severity-the less responsible
they are for solving the problem.24
The 99th Congress sought to accomplish the same objectives
by promoting the use of private cleanups. But, blessed with hind-
sight, Congress adopted numerous statutory safeguards preventing
the EPA from "cutting deals" with industry representatives. These
statutory provisions may be divided into two classes: those that
rely on third party/public intervention to encourage proper en-
forcement of the Act, and those that rely on legislative and judicial
overview mechanisms to do so.
1. Third Party/Public Intervention. SARA increases the op-
portunities for public participation in several ways. First, it re-
quires the EPA to publish notice (with a 30-day comment period)
of any proposed remedial plan or settlement, whether or not it is
subject to judicial approval.25 Once the EPA decides upon a final
24 Environmental Emergency Response Act, Rep. No. 96-848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 98
(1980)(letter from EPA Administrator to the Hon. Jennings Randolph, Chrmn., Senate
Comm. on Environmental and Public Works).
25 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9622(d)(2) (West Supp. 1985) (public participation requirements
for consent decrees) and 42 U.S.C.A. § 9622(i) (public participation requirements for out-of-
court settlements). Section 9622(i) provides as follows:
(1) PUBLICATION IN FEDERAL REGISTER-At least 30 days before any
settlement (including any settlement arrived at through arbitration) may become
final .... the head of the department or agency which has jurisdiction over the
proposed settlement shall publish in the Federal Register notice of the proposed
451]
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response, it again must publish notice of the terms of the action,
along with another period for public comment, before any remedial
action is actually taken.28
Second, at every step of these procedures, Congress now re-
quires explicit record keeping. The EPA must now address in writ-
ing each of the major objections to the proposed plans of action,
along with its reasons for accepting or rejecting any alternative
plans.2 7 SARA also allows intervention as of right in any pending
settlement. The notice shall identify the facility concerned and the parties to the
proposed settlement.
(2) COMMENT PERIOD-For a 30-day period beginning on the date of
publication of notice under paragraph (1) of a proposed settlement, the head of
the department or agency which has jurisdiction over the proposed settlement
shall provide an opportunity for persons who are not parties to the proposed set-
tlement to file written comments relating to the proposed settlement.
(3) CONSIDERATION OF COMMENTS-The head of the department or
agency shall consider any comments filed under paragraph (2) in determining
whether or not to consent to the proposed settlement and may withdraw or with-
hold consent to the settlement if such comments disclose facts or considerations
which indicate the proposed settlement is inappropriate, improper, or inadequate.
42 U.S.C.A. § 9622(i)(1)-(3) (West Supp. 1987).
The requirements of Section 9622(d)(2) essentially mirror these procedures. It is impor-
tant to note that in Section 9622(d)(2) publicly registered objections are filed with the over-
seeing court, while in Section 9622(i)(3), objections are filed with the EPA.
26 Id. at § 9617. These recordation provisions detail a number of additional publicity
and comment procedures:
(a) PROPOSED PLAN-Before adoption of any plan for remedial action to be
undertaken by the President. . . [he] shall take both of the following actions:
(1) Publish a notice and brief analysis of the proposed plan and make such
plan available to the public.
(2) Provide a reasonable opportunity for submission of written and oral com-
ments and an opportunity for a public meeting at or near the facility at issue
regarding the proposed plan and regarding any proposed findings under Section
9621(d)(4) of this title (relating to cleanup standards). The President or the State
shall keep a transcript of the meeting and make such transcript available to the
public. The notice and analysis published under paragraph (1) shall include suffi-
cient information as may be necessary to provide a reasonable explanation of the
proposed plan and alternative proposals considered.(b) FINAL PLAN-Notice of
the final remedial action plan adopted shall be published and the plan shall be
made available to the public before commencement of any remedial action. Such
final plan shall be accompanied by a discussion of any significant changes (and the
reasons for such changes) in the proposed plan and a response to each of the sig-
nificant comments, criticisms, and new data submitted in written or oral presenta-
tions under subsection (a).
Id. at § 9617(a)-(b).
Subsections (c) and (d) then provide for publication in local newspapers of the remedial
plan once it has been adopted. Id. at § 9617(c)-(d).
27 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9617(a)(2) and (c); 9622(d)(2)(A); 9622(i)(3) (West Supp. 1987). This
recording requirement serves a dual purpose: not only does it provide the public with infor-
mation on which it may act to bring future objections or to file a lawsuit against the agency,
but it also facilitates judicial review of the EPA's actions once a consent decree is proposed
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lawsuit for any person who has a practical interest in the outcome
of the terms of the remedial action.2" Finally, SARA permits a pri-
vate right of action against either the EPA (for violations of its
nondiscretionary duties) or against private parties (for contribut-
ing to the hazardous waste site in question).29 Most importantly,
SARA provides private parties up to $50,000 per site for technical
assistance in evaluating the nature of the environmental hazard
and the feasibility of a proposed remedial plan. 0
2. Judicial and Legislative Overview. SARA also creates a
number of judicial and legislative overview mechanisms that limit
the EPA's discretion to negotiate and enter into settlements with
industry defendants. These include specific guidelines circumscrib-
ing the EPA's ability to formulate de minimis settlements with
PRPs, to grant them covenants not to sue, and to enter any Sec-
tion 9606 agreements requiring the PRPs, rather than the EPA, to
clean up the hazardous waste sites. The EPA now has a statutory
duty to reject a de minimis settlement with a PRP unless the PRP
is deemed responsible for only a "minor portion" of the cleanup
costs and detrimental effects on the surrounding environment,"
or a lawsuit is filed.
28 Id. at § 9613(i). The section provides for intervention as a matter of right for any
person who "claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that
the disposition of the action may, as a practical matter, impair or impede the person's abil-
ity to protect that interest, unless the President or the State shows that the person's inter-
est is adequately represented by existing parties."
29 Id. at § 9659. Section 9659 provides a private right of action against the EPA for
failure to perform any nondiscretionary duties under the Act, and against private parties for
failure to comply with CERCLA standards and regulations. In order to counteract the po-
tential dilatory effects of these third-party suits, however, they may not be initiated until
after a proposed remedial action is actually commenced. Id. at § 9659(a)(1).
30 Id. at § 9617(e). This grant is especially important in counteracting the major obsta-
cles to public participation in the CERCLA process-the layman's inability to assess ade-
quately the initial need for remedial action and the technical deficiencies of proposed reme-
dial plans, and the public's lack of incentive to raise the funds to acquire this information
when the costs to the public health are not immediately apparent. See David Allan Feller,
Private Enforcement of Federal Anti-Pollution Laws through Citizen Suits: A Model, 60
Denver L.J. 533, 564 (1983).
21 Id. at § 9622(g)(1). In addition to the "minor portion" requirement, Congress now
also limits the EPA's ability to enter into settlements until either of the following conditions
is met:
(A) Both of the following are minimal in comparison to other hazardous sub-
stances at the facility:
(i) The amount of the hazardous substances contributed by that party to the
facility.
(ii) The toxic or other hazardous effects of the substances contributed by that
party to the facility.
or
(B) The potentially responsible party-
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and may enter a covenant not to sue a PRP only if the covenant
satisfies a lengthy list of requirements which the agency must spe-
cifically consider in writing and which generally cannot be met in
most underground decontamination actions.32
Most important for purposes of this comment, Congress now
requires that all private cleanups be enforced through consent de-
crees, rather than through administrative orders.3 3  Section
(i) is the owner of the real property on or in which the facility is located;
(ii) did not conduct or permit the generation, transportation, storage, treat-
ment, or disposal of any hazardous substance at the facility; and
(iii) did not contribute to the release or threat of release of a hazardous sub-
stance at the facility through any action or omission.
42 U.S.C.A. § 9622(g)(1)(A)-(B).
Section 9622(g) further provides that any de minimis settlement must be embodied in a
consent decree or an administrative order, but is not subject to the usual notice and com-
ment procedures. Id. at § 9622(g)(4).
312 Id. at § 9622(f)(1). These covenants are now available only if:
(A) The covenant not to sue is in the public interest.(B) The covenant not to sue
would expedite response action . . .(C) The person is in full compliance with a
consent decree under [Section 9606] ... for response to the release or threatened
release concerned.(D) The response action has been approved by the President.
Id. at § 9622(f)(1)(A)-(D). The section then enumerates the factors for determining whether
the covenant is in the public interest. The EPA must consider:
(A) The effectiveness and reliability of the remedy, in light of the other alterna-
tive remedies considered for the facility concerned. (B) The nature of the risks
remaining at the facility. (C) The extent to which performance standards are in-
cluded in the order or decree. (D) The extent to which the response action pro-
vides a complete remedy for the facility, including a reduction in the hazardous
nature of the substances at the facility. (E) The extent to which the technology
used in the response action is demonstrated to be effective. (F) Whether the Fund
or other sources of funding would be available for any additional remedial actions
that might eventually be necessary at the facility. (G) Whether the remedial ac-
tion will be carried out, in whole or in significant part, by the responsible parties
themselves.
Id. at § 9622(f)(4)(A)-(G). Section 9622(f)(5) further requires that any covenant not to sue
"be subject to the satisfactory performance by such party of its obligations under the agree-
ment concerned." See also § 9622(j)(2) (requiring federal natural resource trustee approval
before the EPA may make a covenant not to sue for damages to natural resources). Subsec-
tion 9622(f)(4)(D) in particular prevents the widespread use of covenants not to sue in sub-
surface waste cleanup actions.
33 There is some disagreement as to which of these devices is generally favored by the
agency. Some commentators suggest that the EPA strongly favors entering environmental
enforcement actions as consent decrees. Anderson, 1985 Duke L.J. at 287 (cited in note 19)
("Most settlements to date have been judicially approved as consent decrees."); Robert V.
Percival, The Bounds of Consent: Consent Decrees, Settlements and Federal Environmental
Policy Making, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. 327, 330 ("the vast majority of environmental enforce-
ment actions are resolved by negotiated settlement"), citing Jeffrey G. Miller, Private En-
forcement of Federal Pollution Control Laws, Part II, 14 Env't L. Rep. (Env't Law Inst.)
10063, 10080 (1984). At least one EPA administrator maintains, however, that the agency
prefers to issue administrative orders. Telephone interview with Norman Niedergang, Chief,
EPA Region V CERCLA Enforcement Section (Oct. 2, 1986).
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9622(d)(1)(A) of SARA provides that "[w]henever the [EPA] en-
ters into an agreement ... with any potentially responsible party
with respect to remedial action under section 9606 ... the agree-
ment shall be entered ... as a consent decree. '3 4 The legislative
history of SARA indicates that Congress intended this provision to
promote several objectives: to minimize costly and time-consuming
litigation; to utilize the technological and financial resources of the
PRPs, rather than the EPA; and, most importantly, to ensure that
all EPA settlements be made "in the public interest," so as to
avoid a "sweetheart" settlement such as that produced in Sey-
mour.3 5 Whether Congress' use of the judiciary to curb the EPA's
discretion in formulating hazardous waste settlements was an ap-
propriate response to the perceived inadequacies in the agency's
prior negotiation policies is discussed below.
III. THE MANDATORY USE OF CONSENT DECREES IN PRIVATE
CLEANUPS
A. The Benefits of Consent Decrees in Curbing Agency Discretion
and Promoting Efficiency in Enforcement
As noted above, Congress perceived that several benefits
would flow from the mandatory use of consent decrees in private
hazardous waste actions. A thorough examination of the benefits
provided by consent decrees indicates not only that they may in-
crease the agency's accountability, but also that the benefits may
enhance the agency's ability to enforce the settlements into which
it enters.
Stated broadly, Congress intended to increase agency account-
34 42 U.S.C.A. § 9622(d)(1) (West Supp. 1987). Section 9622(d) also provides that the
entry of a consent decree shall not be construed as an acknowledgement of liability by any
party, id. at 9622(d)(1)(B), and that actions conducted under Section 9604 may be entered
either as consent decrees or as administrative orders, id. at 9622(d)(3). The legislative his-
tory indicates that the reason for the latter provision, in contrast to the mandatory use of
consent decrees for Section 9606 settlements, is that "Section 106 [9606] . . .is the only
section where a settlement agreement can be revised or enforced by a court." Superfund
Amendments of 1985, House Committee on Energy and Commerce, H.Rep. 99-253 Part 1,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. 101 (1985).
Section 9622 further requires that all settlements be consistent with the National Con-
tingency Plan ("NCP"),-codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 9605 (West Supp. 1987). The NCP, which
has always required that the most cost-effective means must be chosen among equally effec-
tive plans and that cleanups be conducted at sites where they will be utilized most effi-
ciently, has been amended also to impose more stringent requirements on the order in which
sites are chosen for cleanup. Id. at § 9605.
"I See Superfund Amendments of 1985, House Committee on Energy and Commerce,
H.R. 99-253 Part 1, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 101-103 (1985). See also text at notes 4-12.
451]
464 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
ability by mandating judicial oversight of settlement and by re-
quiring that the agency's prosecutorial discretion is exercised "in
the public interest."3 The standard generally used for measuring
the sufficiency of a decree's terms is that they be "fair, reasonable,
and adequate. 37 Admittedly this standard may be so malleable as
to be almost meaningless.3 8 Yet in principle it demands at least a
minimal level of compliance with the substantive provisions of
CERCLA, and also creates a mechanism to ensure adequate repre-
sentation of consenting parties and to equalize their relative bar-
gaining positions.
The degree to which a federal district court will engage in a
substantive review of the terms of a decree varies widely from
court to court. Some judges refuse to reject a decree as inadequate
unless it is patently illegal on its face, while others take a much
more active role in scrutinizing its terms.39 This variance is due in
large part to the position into which these courts have been thrust
by the very nature of decrees as quasi-adjudicatory mechanisms:
the judge must make an intelligent inquiry into the merits of the
underlying claim without fully trying the case. SARA, while not
specifying a particular level of judicial inquiry into the merits of
Superfund decrees, nevertheless facilitates a more concrete and
comprehensive review, by providing both a "paper trail" of agency
documentation throughout the negotiation process40 and a de-
tailed, extensive body of substantive requirements (including those
governing de minimis settlements and covenants not to sue) which
hazardous waste sites must now meet.4' In this way, Congress at-
" Although SARA itself does not codify this public interest standard, the legislative
history demonstrates that this was Congress's intent when it passed the provision. See H.R.
99-253 at 101 ("[t]he Administrator is encouraged to enter into settlements where they are
in the public interest") (cited in note 35).
37 See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982); United States v. Hooker
Chemicals and Plastics Corp., 540 F. Supp. 1067, 1072 (W.D.N.Y. 1982).
38 See Judith Resnik, Judging Consent, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. 43, 88-90.
Id. at 90 n.165.
40 See text at note 27.
4' For example, before the CERCLA amendments were passed, it was entirely possible
for the EPA to declare a site officially "clean" when it still contained a concentration of
contamination high enough to violate the levels prescribed by other federal statutes such as
the Safe Drinking Water Act. Compare 40 C.F.R. § 300 (National Oil and Hazardous Sub-
stances Pollution Contingency Plan) with 42 U.S.C. § 300(f)-(j) (1982 and Supp. 1985).
Under SARA, all hazardous waste cleanups must comply with the substantive standards
issued under other federal environmental laws. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9621(d)(2)(A)(i) (1986) (West
Supp. 1987). Similarly, covenants not to sue and de minimis settlements, which previously
went entirely unregulated by statute, now must conform with specific standards before they
may be issued. See notes 31-32.
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tempted to limit a court's ability to approve one-sided agreements
such as those in Seymour Recycling and similar cases. 42
A court's review of the substantive merits of a decree is related
to its determination of the adequacy of party representation at the
bargaining table. To a certain extent, one can decide whether rep-
resentation is adequate by an analysis of the merits of the agree-
ment. A decree's substantive compliance with CERCLA is thus
particularly important in Superfund negotiations, where responsi-
ble parties are frequently represented by self-appointed agents or
are absent altogether. On a given issue, the "environmental move-
ment" typically is either only loosely coalesced or entirely nonexis-
tent.43 Similarly, industry PRPs may have radically conflicting in-
terests, and some may never be located. In each case, the duty of
the district court, much like its duty in a formal class action, is to
ensure that the consent upon which the decree rests is comprehen-
sive, representative, and, consequently, authoritative with respect
to the substantive claims of all potentially interested parties.
While SARA does not specify what standards a judge must use to
reach this determination, it facilitates the process by encouraging
effective methods for third parties to get their claims before the
court by formally intervening in the action, by registering objec-
tions to EPA proposed settlements, or by filing related citizen suits
against the agency or PRPs."
The judiciary performs a similar supervisory function in the
consent decree process when the real parties in interest (i.e., the
public and the PRPs) have disproportionate resources and bar-
gaining power. Environmental cases generally involve a large in-
dustry party opposed by a citizen group whose main hope for coun-
tervailing power is through the judiciary.45 In such cases, the
42 Congress's intent on this score was unmistakeable. The House Committee on Energy
and Commerce stated that "the Committee specifically notes its disapproval of the releases
granted in the settlements entered into in the Seymore Recycling [sic] case... and expects
and intends that any camparale [sic] releases that might be presented for court approval
would be rejected as not in the public interest." Superfund Amendments of 1985, House
Committee on Energy and Commerce, H.Rep. 99-253 Part 1, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 101-03
(1985).
'" See Laura Lake, ed., Environmental Mediation: The Search for Consensus 7 (1985)
("Search for Consensus") (the "environmental movement" consists of a variety of interests
which "ought not to be viewed as a monolith of shared objectives and solidarity").
4 Compare Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L.J. 1073, 1078-82 (1984) (courts
should perform supervisory function, albeit in the context of litigation) with Frank Easter-
brook, Justice and Contract in Consent Judgments, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. 19, 30 and n.16
(judicial supervision adds little to the authoritativeness of consent).
" See David Schoenbrod, Limits and Dangers of Environmental Mediation: A Review
Essay, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1453, 1461-62 (1983); Allan R. Talbot, Settling Things: Six Case
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weaker parties may be forced to agree to a settlement where a
stronger party would not be so inclined.46 Assuming a relatively
high degree of judicial involvement, the presence of a judicial me-
diator may help rectify this particular imbalance. 1
Judicial supervision through the use of consent decrees may
also promote administrative consistency and efficiency in the
EPA's enforcement of the decrees once they are entered. For ex-
ample, the permanence of consent decrees as opposed to settle-
ment agreements may also be useful in Superfund negotiations, es-
pecially as they pertain to underground decontamination actions.
As previously indicated, the removal of subsurface wastes from a
site may span several decades and therefore several administra-
tions.48 Although there is much disagreement among legal scholars
regarding the validity of the consent given by one administrator to
bind his or her successors through the use of long-term consent
decrees, 49 one point remains clear: if long-term subsurface settle-
ments are to provide any continuity and certainty in the hazard-
ous-waste removal process, consent decrees create a more stable
mechanism than mere private agreements for ensuring the stability
of the legal principles embodied in the agreements."
Studies in Environmental Mediation 2 (1983) ("Settling Things").
4' Fiss outlines three ways in which a disparity in resources may influence a settlement:
1) the poorer party may be less able to amass and analyze as much information on the issue
as its wealthier counterpart; 2) the poorer party may need the damages money immediately,
thus settling for less now rather than more later; and 3) the poorer party might be forced to
settle due to lack of resources to finance a potentially lengthy trial. Fiss, 93 Yale L.J. at 1076
(cited in note 44). Consent decrees (as opposed to litigation) help alleviate at least the sec-
ond and third of these concerns because of the judicial involvement that is present.
47 The balance of power between the EPA and the PRPs is not as well-defined. Pre-
sumably, the EPA possesses much greater influence with respect to the PRPs than do pri-
vate citizen groups, but its ability to fulfill its statutory duties may be circumscribed by its
ability to receive sufficient funding from Congress.
418 Casey Bukro, Overburdened Superfund Needs To Clean Up Its Act, Chicago Trib-
une, § 5, p. 1, col. 1 (Oct. 12, 1986).
49 Compare Michael W. McConnell, Why Hold Elections? Using Consent Decrees to
Insulate Policies from Political Change, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. 295, with Peter M. Shane,
Federal Policy Making by Consent Decree: An Analysis of Agency and Judicial Discretion,
1987 U. Chi. Legal F. 241.
The Department of Justice has issued guidelines preventing federal agency officials
from entering into consent decrees which limit the discretion of successors on the negotiated
topic. Specific exceptions to the policy must be approved by high-ranking members of the
Department. Memorandum from the Attorney General, Department Policy Concerning Con-
sent Decrees and Settlement Agreements (March 13, 1986) (on file with the University of
Chicago Legal Forum) reprinted in part in 54 U.S.L.W. 2492 (April 1, 1986) ("Department
of Justice Guidelines").
"o This factor is especially important where the intent of the signatories may be in-
creasingly subject to "selective recall" over time, whereas presumably the legal values un-
derlying the agreement will remain relatively constant. This argument to some extent also
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Furthermore, a consent decree provides incentives for in-
creased industry compliance by virtue of the symbolic value of its
judicial stamp of approval: "[flailing to perform under a consent
decree is a violation of the 'law,' whereas failing to perform as re-
quired by contract-even though a transgression of the law of con-
tracts-is somehow less obviously a breach of the law. '51
Consent decrees also facilitate the monitoring of compliance
after the decree is entered. For example, in cases where the parties
anticipate an extended period of compliance (such as in those
agreements involving subsurface decontamination), the use of con-
sent decrees enables the signatories not only to avoid the delays
inherent in litigation, but also to obtain appearances before the
same judge who approved the decree.2
The entry of a consent decree aids enforcement in other ways
as well. For example, as a result of a consent decree, the EPA may
become a judgment creditor and take priority over creditors pursu-
ant to settlements should the PRP file for bankruptcy.5 3 These ju-
dicial orders, unlike settlements, are then given full faith and
credit across state lines. 4
Finally, judicial involvement may be required to enable the
parties in an environmental dispute to reach any agreement at all.
Typically, such negotiations may involve unpredictable long-term
trends as well as numerous parties or factions with disparate inter-
ests and rigid ideological positions-all of which decrease the like-
lihood of successful negotiations.5 The presence of an objective
authority may greatly increase the chances that the differences
may be resolved without resorting to litigation.56
B. The Hidden Drawbacks of Using Consent Decrees in
Superfund Negotiations
Requiring the use of consent decrees in all private hazardous
counteracts a certain philosophical queasiness concerning the congressionally-mandated use
of consent decrees.
I" Resnik, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. at 64 (cited in note 38).
52 Id. at 66. The EPA now also uses a computerized system for tracking PRP compli-
ance with consent decrees, thereby facilitating the process of enforcing agreements on a long
term basis. 14 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1615 (Jan. 20, 1984).
13 See 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1982).
U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1.
" See Patricia M. Wald, Negotiation of Environmental Disputes, 10 Colum. J. Env't L.
1, 7 (1985).
11 But see Comment, Objectivity and Accountability: Limits on Judicial Involvement in
Settlement, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. 369.
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waste negotiations is not without its costs. In fact, Congress's insis-
tence on the use of consent decrees in hazardous waste enforce-
ment under CERCLA's particular administrative framework is
highly problematic. There is a severe tension between the legisla-
tive desire in CERCLA to encourage private parties to conduct
toxic waste cleanups voluntarily and the desire in SARA to provide
sufficient oversight of those private efforts.
Using consent decrees to resolve hazardous waste disputes pre-
supposes a substantial level of judicial involvement in the evalua-
tion of proposed consent decrees under Section 9606.51 A trial
court cannot effectively counteract the undue influence of private
interests upon the administrative process without conducting a
fairly extensive investigation into the adequacy of the agreement.
Assuming a high level of scrutiny by the judiciary, one must then
ask whether the mandatory use of consent decrees for all private
cleanups (as opposed to the use of settlements, administrative or-
ders, or litigation) best furthers the objectives of CERCLA. For a
number of reasons, the answer is no. Although SARA's primary
goal is to curb agency discretion, its negative secondary effects may
actually heighten the possibility of industry manipulation of the
waste cleanup agreements and inhibit the development of a consis-
tent national policy of hazardous waste enforcement.
1. The Dilatory Effects of Consent Decrees Within the CER-
CLA Framework. In order to analyze the potential delays caused
by the SARA consent decree provisions, it is helpful first to deter-
mine how frequently these decrees may in fact be used. In the last
several years, the EPA has begun initial Remedial Investigation/
Feasibility Studies ("RI/FS") at approximately 400 sites on the
National Priorities List ("NPL") 58 -up from approximately thirty
which had been initiated from 1980 to 19825 9-many of which are
just now reaching the settlement and negotiation stage. In addi-
tion, SARA now requires the EPA to initiate 375 new long-term
cleanups by 1992.60 Meanwhile, the number of contemporaneous
1 In fact, the courts may have little choice in the matter. After Local Number 93 v.
City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 3063 (1986), courts supervising the entry of consent decrees for
Section 9606 cleanups arguably must be sufficiently involved with the settlement so as to
ascertain properly whether (1) a decree is within the general scope of the pleadings; (2) the
decree furthers the "objectives" of the law under which the case was filed; and (3) the de-
cree requires no action in violation of the statute. Local Number 93, 106 S. Ct. at 3077.
58 See note 18 for a description of the RI/FS and NPL process.
'9 By 1982 the EPA had initiated RI/FS at only 29 of 114 sites on the NPL. Florio, 3
Yale J. Reg. at 364 n.66 (cited at note 17). By 1985, this number had reached 450. EPA,
Superfund Factbook 3 (2d Ed. 1985).
60 42 U.S.C.A. § 9616(e)(1)-(2) (West Supp. 1985).
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short-term hazardous waste removals could reach into the
thousands.6 1 These numbers, taken in conjunction with SARA's
elimination of some of the barriers to privately-conducted clean-
ups," indicate that there will be a substantial increase in the num-
ber reaching the courts in the form of consent decrees.
Yet the courts simply are not logistically well-equipped to
oversee the vast numbers of Superfund cases scheduled to be initi-
ated in the next few years.6 Although it is no answer to posit
blindly that courts simply cannot and should not conduct the nec-
essary fact-finding to process the volatile and technically complex
cases presented by nonadversarial Superfund cleanups, these dis-
putes are particularly difficult for the judiciary to understand
thoroughly.6 4
Even if the judiciary were able to carry out sufficient fact-find-
ing procedures to prevent "sweetheart" deals from occurring, some
of the most pressing dangers created by the mandatory consent de-
01 By 1984 the EPA estimated that 1,400-2,200 of the roughly 20,000 sites scheduled for
RIFS presented environmental hazards of sufficient scope and immediacy that they should
be included on the National Priority List. Supplemental Appropriation for Superfund Being
Considered for Fiscal 1984, EPA Says, 14 Env't. Rep. (BNA) 1245 (Nov. 4, 1983).
02 See text at note 21. Even under the more restrictive version of CERCLA, between
1980 and 1984 the EPA entered roughly eight times as many settlements as it had funded
cleanups.
'3 EPA Counsel Says Courts Ill-Equipped to Handle Influx of Hazardous Waste Suits,
15 Env't. Rep. (BNA) 1252-53 (Nov. 16, 1984). In fact, the United States Supreme Court
has registered substantial doubt as to the judiciary's ability to oversee effectively the in-
creasing complexity of environmental regulations. In Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), the Court appeared to adopt a significantly more deferential
attitude toward judicial review of EPA decision making than had been set forth previously,
stating:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute it administers, it...
does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary
in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent
or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is
whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.
Id. at 842-43 (footnotes omitted). See also Chemical Manufacturers Association v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, 470 U.S. 116 (1985); Wald, 10 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 1 (cited in
note 55). Compare Harold Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the
Courts, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 509, 524-26 (1974) (advocating a "hard look" approach to EPA
decision making).
"' See Michael J. Hickok and Joyce A. Padleschat, Strategic Considerations in Defend-
ing and Settling a Superfund Case, 19 Loyola of L.A. L. Rev. 1213, 1220 (1986) (advocating
bifurcation of the issues, since Superfund agreements are inherently lengthy and complex);
Lake, Search for Consensus at 6 (cited in note 43) (footnotes omitted):
the traditional bureaucratic response of incrementalism does not always apply to
environmental decisionmaking, since the physical damage from a project may be
irreversible. Thus, unlike a social or economic policy which can be reformulated
and renegotiated over time, the implementation of environmental policy at the
local level poses particularly difficult problems for bureaucrats.
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cree provision are those resulting from the delays caused by the
fact-finding process inherent in the decrees. Although CERCLA
does not mandate that the court make specific findings of fact in
evaluating the decree, the legislative history does suggest that it
engage in a fairly extensive inquiry into the propriety of the de-
cree's terms.6 5 Due to the complexity of most hazardous waste ne-
gotiations, this fact-finding process may span weeks and even
months-sometimes lasting as long as if the case were fully liti-
gated. 6 When combined with the panoply of notice-and-comment
procedures which regulate the formulation of decrees before they
even reach the courts, one must ask whether the extra procedural
safeguards provided by consent decrees are really worth the effort
in all cases. In order to make this determination, one must identify
the possible negative consequences of the delays caused by the
mandatory use of consent decrees in Superfund negotiations.
2. A Shift to Publicly-Administered Hazardous Waste
Cleanups? As a preliminary matter, it is important to note that the
postponement of agreement is more likely to hurt local public in-
terest organizations than industrial parties in the dispute. The or-
ganizational costs of delay are greatest for ad hoc, volunteer groups
that run the risk of collapsing long before a final decision is
reached.67 This result undermines Congress's intent to equalize rel-
ative bargaining positions of the parties.
The most pressing danger of the mandatory use of consent de-
crees in hazardous waste cases, however, is that the excessive use
of judicial review and fact-finding may consume so much time and
money as to force the EPA to shift from agency reliance on private
cleanups to agency cleanups for any and all toxic waste sites re-
quiring expedited remedial action. The incentives for this policy
shift become more apparent when one integrates the new consent
65 See text at note 39-41.
'6 See, for example, Maryland v. U.S., 460 U.S. 1001 (1983), in which the Court took
six months to formulate the decree.
67 It is ironic that the judicial instrument used to eliminate perceived inequities in the
bargaining power of these two parties may in some cases also cause just the opposite result.
See text at notes 28-30. Some scholars advocate mediation as the mechanism best suited for
reaching relatively quick and enduring resolutions to environmental conflicts. See Talbot,
Settling Things (cited in note 45). This view has been justly criticized by others who recog-
nize that current environmental statutes simply do not always promote the speedy and final
adjudication of issues because they simply "involve too many steps and leave too many hard
issues unresolved." Schoenbrod, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 1453 (cited in note 45). See also Perci-
val, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. at.333 (cited in note 33) ("[environmental] settlement negotia-
tions may be so protracted that settlement ultimately proves to be more costly than pro-
ceeding to trial").
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decree provision with the other sections of the revised CERCLA
statute.
First of all, it is not at all clear that the congressional schedule
requiring the EPA to initiate and supervise 375 site cleanups over
the next five years is realistically attainable under the new amend-
ments. Because of the bill's addition of many new procedural re-
quirements and the increased workload created by the EPA's re-
cent initiation of hundreds of new NPL RI/FS studies, some EPA
officials estimate that no more than fifty sites-less than one-third
of the target number-will be cleaned up by 1990.68 One former
Superfund official has further suggested that the notice-and-com-
ment procedures alone will add a minimum of one year onto the
negotiation process before the EPA can even begin to arrange a
hazardous waste site cleanup. 9
Thus, when faced with a hazardous waste site which presents a
substantial danger to the public, the EPA will have two options.
First, it may clean up the site itself, thereby avoiding the full no-
tice-and-comment procedures, and the delays associated with ne-
gotiating, formulating, and obtaining approval of a consent decree,
in addition to any other dilatory tactics pursued by industrial par-
ties to whose distinct advantage it is to postpone remedial action
as long as possible. Alternatively, the EPA may attempt to force
the PRPs to clean up the site by entering into a consent decree,
thus suffering the delays described above, or bringing suit against
the PRPs.70 Given these alternatives, it is not difficult to predict a
"6 Statement by William N. Hedeman, Jr., former manager of the federal Superfund
program, 17 Env't Rep. (BNA) 820-21 (Oct. 3, 1986). Similarly, EPA Administrator Lee M.
Thomas warned that the new CERCLA provisions relating to settlement schedules and
cleanup standards, federal facilities, and the community "right-to-know" would lead to a
"burdensome and lengthy process that would slow down the cleanup progress" and leave
mor citizens exposed to the dangers of hazardous waste. Public Works Panel's Superfund
Bill Would Slow Cleanup Process, Thomas Says, 16 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1076 (Oct. 25, 1985).
9 Presentation by William N. Hedeman, Jr., at the University of Chicago, May 14,
1987.
70 A third, rarely utilized alternative would be to invoke the emergency procedures out-
lined in the Superfund amendments bill, which allows the EPA to abandon CERCLA's
strict procedural requirements to facilitate agreement "[w]henever practicable and in the
public interest." 42 U.S.C.A. § 9622(a) (West Supp. 1987). Despite the apparent breadth of
this language, substantially similar language has been held to require proof of a real emer-
gency. Union of Concerned Scientists v. NRC, 711 F.2d 370, 382 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (construing
comparable section of Administrative Procedure Act).
It is informative to note the criticisms registered by legal commentators regarding the
excessive inflexibility of the settlement guidelines formulated by the EPA even before codi-
fication by Congress. Critics recently have charged that the complexity of the Interim Set-
tlement Guideline process, described in note 18 and accompanying text, has unduly ham-
pered the EPA in its efforts to negotiate settlements with industry polluters. Anderson, 1985
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significant shift by the EPA toward the agency cleanup option.71
Although it is not necessarily undesirable to have the govern-
ment conduct a certain percentage of hazardous waste cleanups, a
significant shift to agency cleanups would be at best an ineffective
and most likely an unworkable solution. The negative conse-
quences triggered by heavy reliance on EPA-effectuated cleanups
(as opposed to PRP-effectuated ones) are manifold. They include:
increasing governmental costs to enforce CERCLA, abandoning
Congress's policy of effectuating efficient private cleanups, and un-
dermining the public interest in holding waste site contributors lia-
ble for their actions.
EPA-effectuated cleanups have been extremely costly and
inefficient in the past. Though the long-term cost to the govern-
ment of using Section 9604 as an enforcement tool was intended to
be minimal, the actual administration of the Fund reveals quite a
different story.
Congress initially supplied the EPA with $1.6 billion to con-
duct expedited cleanups where necessary. These funds were to be
reimbursed fully by identified responsible parties.72 However, a
wealth of documentation exists which suggests that EPA expendi-
tures of Fund monies to conduct its own cleanups have been ex-
tremely wasteful and inefficient compared to those made by pri-
vate parties. 73 A recent internal EPA study indicated that the
Duke L.J. at 298-99 (cited in note 19).
7' One EPA official acknowledged the potential for the forced shift from Section 9606
to Section 9604 under the new CERCLA settlement requirements, noting that if the backlog
of consent decrees became too heavy, the EPA would have to rely on Section 9604 to con-
duct quick remedial actions. Telephone interview with Kate Sellars, Superfund Environ-
mental Engineer with Region V, EPA, Washington, D.C. (Oct. 2, 1986).
72 It should be noted, however, that Congress never expected some of these costs to be
reimbursed. At many hazardous waste sites, barrels of toxic materials may have been aban-
doned there for decades, thus eliminating almost all chance of locating the responsible par-
ties. The damage caused by these abandoned wastes is called an "orphan share," which the
Fund was intended to cover.
7 For example, a newsletter published by a company that performs technical site as-
sessments estimates EPA assessment and cleanup costs at roughly thirty to forty percent
more than equivalent private cleanups. See Anderson, 1985 Duke L.J. at 302 n.143 (cited in
note 19). Similarly, a recent internal EPA audit indicated that contractors who have per-
formed cleanups at Superfund sites have billed the EPA up to 100 times more for equip-
ment, and up to double the labor costs, than the contractors had originally estimated for the
job. Superfund Contractors Overcharge Service, Contract Competition Lacking, Auditor
Says, 17 Env't Rep. (BNA) 734, 734-35 (Sept. 19, 1986). This is true even though a PRP's
refusal to reimburse the EPA when ordered to do so by an administrative order carries with
it a penalty of treble damages. Also, in Seymour Recycling itself the PRPs were able to
conduct a surface cleanup estimated by the EPA at $15 million for just $7.7 million. Over-
sight and Investigations Subcommittee Report at 8 (Dec. 15, 1985) (cited in note 3).
The disparity between federal and private cleanup costs is sometimes so great that in
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agency has collected only 1.1 percent of the Superfund monies it
has spent under Section 9604 of CERCLA to date.74 These losses
are exacerbated by the retention of increased numbers of agency
personnel presumably needed to enforce Superfund under Section
9606; the EPA's record from 1980-1984 showed expenditures
amounting to as much as two and one-half times more on adminis-
trative costs than on remedial expenses. 5
A CERCLA framework which encourages (albeit unintention-
ally) increased reliance on agency cleanups flies in the face of Con-
gress' intention to increase the agency's efficient use of private
cleanups. If Congress perceived its mission as one of encouraging
the cost-effectiveness of waste site decontamination, the deterrence
of inadequate toxic waste disposal, and the payment by responsible
parties for such disposal,76 its preference should also be to en-
two recent cases industry parties actually sued the EPA, requesting the district courts to
order them to perform the necessary cleanup rather than to allow the EPA to do so. Lone
Pine Steering Committee v. EPA, 600 F. Supp. 1487 (D.N.J. 1985), aff'd, 777 F.2d 882 (3d
Cir. 1985); Midwest Solvent Recovery, No. H-79-556 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 14, 1984).
7' Auditors Show EPA Recovered 1.1 Percent of Superfund Expenditures by 1986, 17
Env't Rep. (BNA) 854 (Oct. 10, 1986).
11 New York Attorney General Robert Abrams described the EPA's dismal enforce-
ment record as follows:
Two shocking facts emerge .... First, only one-third of the money obligated for
cleanups has actually been spent. Second, 2/2 times as much money has been
spent on administrative costs as on actual cleanups .... In fiscal 1983, for exam-
ple, actual permanent cleanup work was done at only 17 sites; 124 sites were still
in the study stage. It is astonishing to me that at the end of the year, with 60
percent of the Superfund time period elapsed, a mere $13.2 million-less than 1
percent of the $1.6 billion fund-had been spent on permanent remedial cleanups
at hazardous waste sites.
Implementation of the Superfund Program: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Com-
merce, Transportation and Tourism of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce,
99th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. 472 (1984-85) (statement of Robert Abrams). Mr. Abrams later
stated that from 1981 to 1983, $165.4 million was spent on administrative costs but only
$67.7 million was spent on remedial responses. Id. at 472.
11 It is worth noting the different approach taken by Congress when it was faced with a
similar problem of underenforcement of a federal program by an executive agency. In the
only other major piece of legislation specifically aimed at consent decrees, the Tunney Anti-
trust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)-(h) (1982), Congress departed from the CERCLA framework in
two significant ways: it did not mandate the use of consent decrees in any given set of
circumstances, but it did require that any decree issued be "in the public interest." Id. at
§ 16(e). The adoption of the Tunney Act also stemmed from concern that the government
had been "giving away the store" in antitrust negotiations-a phrase with a familiar ring in
the present context. See Ronald G. Carr, Some Observations on the Tunney Act, 52 Anti-
trust L.J. 953 (1983); Janet L. McDavid, et al., Antitrust Consent Decrees: Ten Years' Expe-
rience Under the Tunney Act, 52 Antitrust L.J. 883 (1983); Note, The Scope of Judicial
Review of Consent Decrees Under the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act of 1974, 82
Mich. L. Rev. 153 (1983).
Although there is no indication that the 98th or the 99th Congress expressly considered
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courage increased reliance on privately-conducted cleanups. These
objectives may not be met if the EPA is compelled to implement
agency cleanups as its principal means of Superfund enforcement.
3. Other Consequences of Mandating Consent Decrees in
Superfund Negotations. One may argue that the new procedural
safeguards under SARA need not result in a wholesale shift from
private to publicly-administered cleanups. Yet given the number of
cleanups the bill now requires the EPA to initiate, combined with
a relatively high level of judicial supervision over them," it is diffi-
cult to foresee a significantly different result.
There are several imaginable actions the EPA could take in
response to the influx of hazardous waste cases. It could increase
the size of its office to oversee the vast numbers of private cleanup
actions. Even assuming away funding problems, though, this alter-
native does not address the fact that the time needed to conduct
the new CERCLA notice-and-comment procedures and the subse-
quent judicial factfinding does not decrease if the case is handled
by ten EPA officials rather than one.
The EPA could also simply fall to prosecute some of the PRPs
if the administrative burden became too great. Implementation of
CERCLA would then rest on private suits against either PRPs or
against the agency for failure to perform its mandatory duties. Of
course, neither of these alternatives would result in the uniform
and efficient administration of national hazardous waste policies.
In a waste dispute the priorities among the parties that are per-
ceived by a district court judge do not necessarily reflect optimal
national priorities; the "public interest" in the context of a judicial
consent decree may differ significantly from the "public interest"
in the context of administrative policy considerations.
Moreover, a broader role for the courts in environmental
cleanup negotiations may result in the abandonment of the courts'
traditional "legal" functions in favor of a comparatively "manage-
rial" role in dispute resolution through consent decrees. 8 SARA
the same methods to curb agency discretion as those embodied in the Tunney Act, one
could reasonably assert that Congress was well aware of the provision. As mentioned above,
it is the only other statute dealing with consent decrees as a tool of agency administration,
and figures prominently in the relevant consent decree literature.
77 See text at notes 31-35.
78 See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 376 (1982); Fiss, 93 Yale
L.J. 1073 (cited in note 44); David Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational Change: Judicial Su-
pervision of Public Institutions, 1983 Duke L.J. 1265, 1303-07 (arguing for a diminished role
of the judiciary in supervising institutional reform and public law disputes). This concern,
however, is counteracted by the arguable necessity of judicial intervention to get the parties
in a complex environmental case to agree to anything. See text at notes 55-56.
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itself seems to shy away from increasing the managerial role of the
courts in the cleanup of hazardous waste sites. The extensive pro-
visions for public participation (especially those providing for in-
tervention as of right and for citizen suits against the EPA),7 9 as
well as for the EPA's expanded factfinding role in the cleanup pro-
cess, imply that Congress generally regarded the EPA and other
interested third parties, not the courts, as the primary overseers of
hazardous waste cleanups. The mandatory consent decree provi-
sion located in Section 9622 of the bill represents the only signifi-
cant provision to the contrary.
IV. BIFURCATION OF ISSUES To MAXIMIZE BENEFITS AND MINIMIZE
COSTS OF CONSENT DECREES
When Congress evaluated various proposals for limiting the
EPA's discretion in the Superfund enforcement process, it cor-
rectly identified many of the public policies favoring the use of
consent decrees in the environmental arena. Congress recognized
that consent decrees may significantly curb agency discretion in
the formulation of hazardous waste agreements, and may promote
efficient long-term enforcement of decrees once they are entered.
However, Congress failed to adequately anticipate the negative im-
pact which delays, caused by the SARA enforcement scheme,
might have on the agency's ability to take swift remedial actions.
Not only do the decrees take time to formulate and supervise, but
the new notice-and-comment procedures themselves may add
months to the process before a cleanup may begin.
If Congress wanted to impose additional constraints on agency
discretion (in the form of consent decrees) above and beyond the
scope of SARA's other new procedures, it should have taken steps
to limit the dilatory effects of these constraints. At the very least
Congress should have bifurcated the enforcement process to re-
quire the use of consent decrees only for agreements pertaining to
underground, as opposed to surface, cleanups. In this way Congress
could have taken advantage of some of the benefits provided by
consent decrees and eliminated many of their drawbacks in the
Superfund context.
Horowitz identifies two additional concerns resulting from an excessive reliance on the
court as manager: 1) the increased potential for judicial bias in favor of or against any one of
the parties, and 2) the inherent problems associated with fashioning complex solutions in-
volving many actors when some of the parties affected-whether directly or indirectly-may
be entirely absent from the negotiations. 1983 Duke L.J. at 1304-05.
11 See text at notes 28-30.
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This bifurcation along surface/subsurface lines makes particu-
lar sense for hazardous waste treatment. The removal of toxic
waste from the surface of a contaminated waste site presents sub-
stantially different policy considerations from those associated
with the cleanup of underground contamination. The former is
much more likely than the latter to require immediate removal of
hazardous waste materials from the surface as a stopgap measure
to reduce the risk of their eventual seepage into the underground
aquifers. Once the surface waste containers are removed, years
may pass before significant action is needed to maintain the
potability of underground water.80
In addition, one can quantify the costs of conducting surface
cleanups much more easily than the costs of underground waste
removal. It is now apparent that previous estimates of the time
and expense required to effectuate the latter have been grossly in-
adequate.81 As Seymour Recycling readily demonstrates, the sur-
face cleanup in that case, originally estimated at $7.7 million, was
completed on time and for precisely the estimated cost.82 By con-
trast, the EPA now estimates that the subsurface cleanup, origi-
nally targeted at $15 million, will take at least $31.9 million and
thirty years to clean up. 3 Recognition of the difference between
surface and subsurface cleanups has led legislative and administra-
tive authorities to suggest bifurcations along surface and subsur-
face lines.84
80 The assistant administrator of the EPA's toxic waste program under RCRA noted in
1983 that, on average, two years elapse between the EPA's learning of the hazard and the
eventual cleanup. Thomas Seeks Review of Groundwater Rules to Shorten Time Between
Detection, Cleanup, 14 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1436, 1436 (1983).
SARA itself contemplates an increased emphasis on the subsurface aspects of waste site
cleanups. Section 9604(e) now allows the expenditure of $2 million over a one-year period
for short-term "removal" type actions, which can be waived if there is a finding that the
removal is consistent with a long-term remedial action. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9604(e)(1)-(2) (West
Supp. 1987). A former EPA administrator has suggested that unlike prior agency policy,
these provisions may allow the EPA to proceed immediately to undertake surface cleanups
without having to make the prerequisite RI/FS, thus shifting the focus of RI/FS to the more
difficult issue of subsurface and groundwater contamination. Letter from William N.
Hedeman, Jr., (cited in note 5).
61 See note 11.
62 In 1984 the twenty-four defendants announced the completion of their work at ex-
actly the $7.7 million figure originally estimated. Statement of Mary Walker, Deputy Assis-
tant Attorney General, Department of Justice, before the House Committee on Public
Works and Transportation (Dec. 15, 1983), cited in Anderson, 1985 Duke L.J. at 302 n. 143
(cited in note 19).
" Bukro, Chicago Tribune Sect. 5 at 1 col. 1 (cited in note 48).
" The EPA has also ostensibly followed a policy of negotiating bifurcated agreements
whereby the EPA may settle only with respect to particular phases of the cleanup opera-
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Given the relative benefits and costs of consent decrees, the
differences between surface and subsurface cleanups suggest that
the most expeditious use of mandatory consent decrees would be
to utilize them where the need for immediate action is at its lowest
and the costs of the EPA's "giving away the store" are the high-
est-that is, in subsurface decontamination actions. In this way
the EPA could best take advantage of the slower yet "safer" quali-
ties of judicial overview through the decrees. By contrast, more
streamlined enforcement mechanisms may be better suited for sur-
face cleanups, which generally require swifter agency action and
involve a reduced risk of running into extremely costly and time-
consuming remedial responses.
There are distinct practical advantages to making the judici-
ary the titular head of enforcement throughout the lengthy process
of underground waste cleanup. 5 This does not mean, however,
that the judiciary must be the principal managerial overseer of the
remedial process on a week-to-week or a month-to-month or even a
year-to-year basis. It also does not mean that the judiciary will
necessarily abdicate its legal function for an excessively managerial
one in enforcing decrees. The primary public-interest features a
court brings to a settlement-those of ensuring the substantive
fairness of an agreement, the authoritativeness of consent, and the
equalization of bargaining power-are performed in large part ei-
ther at the decree formulation stage or at long-term intervals
thereafter, rather than on a regular basis.
There are two substantial objections to the position that the
use of consent decrees should be mandatory only for subsurface
remedial action. First, the use of consent decrees may inordinately
delay underground cleanups which may pose a risk of contamina-
tion just as immediate as the risk posed by toxic wastes located on
tions. See EPA Official Says Settlement Agreements Appropriate for Short-Term Waste
Cleanups, 12 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1055 (Jan. 1, 1982). The agency, however, has not consist-
ently adhered to this plan. Compare the settlement at the Chem-Dyne site in Hamilton,
Ohio, discussed in Largest Voluntary Cleanup Settlement announced for Seymour Site
Under Superfund, 13 Env't Rep. (BNA) 877, 877-78 (Oct. 29, 1982) (following a bifurcated
approach) with that at the Velsicol site in St. Louis, Missouri, described in $38 Million
Record Voluntary Cleanup Settlement Reached for Velsicol Site Under Superfund, 13 Env't
Rep. (BNA) 1165 (Nov. 26, 1982) (no bifurcation of issues).
Legal commentators and the courts have advocated the use of bifurcated procedures,
but have not done so along surface/subsurface lines. Instead, they address bifurcation in the
context of splitting the remedial and the liability issues in negotiation and litigation. See
United States v. Price, No. 80-4104 (D.N.J. Mar. 8, 1985); Hickock and Padleschat, 19
Loyola L.A. L. Rev. at 1220-23 (cited in note 64).
81 See text at notes 48-56.
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the surface of a site. This objection may be answered by recogniz-
ing that in such cases, an emergency agency cleanup may be used
to respond to the immediate threat until the parties agree to a pri-
vate cleanup consent decree. This utilization of agency cleanups
not only avoids the concerns associated with excessive reliance on
government-effectuated cleanups, but also furthers the original
purpose of CERCLA-to provide a flexible system of hazardous
waste removal when the public health is threatened and the re-
sponsible parties cannot develop a rational response in the time
allotted.
A second argument against the nonmandatory use of decrees
for surface cleanups is that the EPA has at its disposal a number
of remedial responses that are unchecked by the judiciary and
therefore are unbridled by judicial mechanisms which ensure that
the agency makes its responses in the public interest. Several fac-
tors indicate that this argument is misplaced here. First, it is a
mistake to say that the only significant way to control agency dis-
cretion is to require judicial supervision of its actions. Many nonju-
dicial avenues, such as administrative lobbying and interest group
information campaigns for and against elected and appointed offi-
cials, as well as formalized EPA settlement policies subject to sub-
sequent judicial review, may perform a similar supervisory func-
tion without the immediate intervention of the courts.
Specifically, CERCLA's notice-and-comment administrative
procedures provide a comprehensive opportunity for curbing the
EPA's prosecutorial discretion. As noted above, CERCLA now re-
quires the EPA to spend several months creating a paper trail for
its decisions either to pursue or release PRPs, and to address pub-
licly the objections to any proposed settlements with industry rep-
resentatives. The EPA's failure to meet these objections in a satis-
factory manner, or fully to prosecute PRPs under CERCLA's new
substantive requirements, may subject the agency to a citizen suit
filed in federal district court. Although this process does not guar-
antee that the agency will always hold PRPs fully responsible for
all surface cleanup costs, it does provide a complete record and
concrete substantive standards by which a court may subsequently
make a determination regarding the EPA's actions.
In addition, the agency's awareness of its more formalized ac-
countability to the public and to the judiciary will deter it from
acting improperly; regardless of prior legislative or judicial supervi-
sion. Indeed, the EPA has demonstrated its sensitivity to criticism
by instituting a variety of in-house settlement policies. Since 1984,
the EPA has promulgated a series of memoranda delineating the
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contours of its official settlement policy, especially with regard to
covenants not to sue.86 One commentator has suggested that the
EPA's self-imposed constraints are so strict that they unduly limit
its ability to reach satisfactory settlements with PRPs.
87
Furthermore, the judiciary's case-by-case method of dispute
resolution limits its ability to regulate effectively complex systemic
changes such as those contemplated by CERCLA. In considering
the wisdom of making the judiciary the public watchdog in any
regulatory scheme, one must be careful to differentiate between
the courts' ability to adjudicate cases and controversies and their
relative inability to manage broad-based institutional change. Ac-
cordingly, "nonjudicial review mechanisms [may be] necessary to
supplement, and, if they are successful, to displace judicial
solutions." 88
SARA includes a host of non-judicial provisions included pre-
cisely for this purpose. The elaborate new notice-and-comment
procedures, the provision for citizen suits against the EPA or in-
dustry defendants, and the open rights of intervention all inject
substantial public supervision into the potentially unchecked issu-
ance by the EPA of administrative orders under Section 9606.89 In
" These settlement policies are laid out in 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.61-300.71 (1986) and in
two EPA memoranda published on August 20, 1984 (reprinted in 15 Env't Rep. (BNA) 699,
699-700 (Aug. 31, 1984)) and on November 29, 1984 (reprinted in 50 Fed. Reg. 5034 (Feb. 5,
1985). For a good description of how these policies work in practice, see Anderson, 1985
Duke L.J. at 287-92 (cited in note 19).
Id at 298-99.
Cass R. Sunstein, Factions, Self-Interest, and the APA: Four Lessons Since 1946, 72
Va. L. Rev. 271, 293 (1986).
89 42 U.S.C.A. § 9606 (West Supp. 1987). Note also that a violation of an agency ad-
ministrative order results in an assessment of treble damages. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(c) (West
Supp. 1987). The effectiveness of citizen group intervention into the enforcement process
may vary widely depending on the case and the barriers to organization found within the
relevant community. See Lake, Search for Consensus at 7 (cited in note 43). In any event,
EPA officials openly acknowledge the possibility that citizen suits will embarrass the agency
when it has not taken action against a particular polluter. EPA Region III, Based in Phila-
delphia, Tackles Enforcement by Targeting Ways of Using Limited Resources to Deter Vio-
lations, 17 Env't Rep. (BNA) 760, 763 (Oct. 19, 1986).
The notice-and-comment procedures also ensure that an industry defendant's due pro:
cess rights are adequately protected when the EPA issues an administrative order against it.
Several cases have questioned the agency's ability to issue an order without first conducting
hearings with regard to the defendant's liability in fact. See Aminoil, Inc. v. EPA, 599 F.
Supp. 69, 74 (C.D. Cal. 1984); Industrial Park Development Co. v. EPA, 604 F. Supp. 1136,
1145 (E.D. Pa. 1985). One court, however, has indicated subsequently that an industry rep-
resentative's due process rights may already be sufficiently protected by the provision pun-
ishing a PRP's failure to comply with EPA orders only upon a showing that the PRP acted
"without sufficient cause." Wagner Electric Corp. v. Thomas, 612 F. Supp. 736, 748 (D. Kan.
1985).
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addition, the substantive standards defining "how clean is clean"
and those limiting the agency's ability to pursue expedited reme-
dial actions and to enter covenants not to sue all constrain the
EPA's choice of remedies. Finally, even if all of these obstacles
should fail in a given instance, the stakes are considerably lower in
surface cleanup negotiations if the EPA should indeed "give away
the store"-there is little danger that doing so would eventually
cost the agency, and ultimately the public, tens of millions of dol-
lars and decades of time.
CONCLUSION
Subsequent to Congress's passage of CERCLA in 1980, the
EPA's approach to the Superfund program has been uneven at
best. The years immediately following the Act's passage were
marked by agency submissions to private industry-group pressures
and to its own self-interested motives which were at odds with
those of the legislature. When Congress decided to correct this
"government failure" by revising the regulatory system, it was jus-
tifiably fueled by both anger and frustration with the agency. How-
ever, during the two-year period in which the legislature evaluated
various proposals to amend the Act, the EPA reversed many of its
previous policies which had led to admittedly dismal results in its
first years of Superfund action.e It now appears that Congress
overstepped the limits of imposing checks, supposedly in the pub-
lic interest, on the agency's already-formalized settlement policies.
Everyone agrees that the problem of toxic waste removal is an
issue of public interest which the government should identify and
remedy. Private waste generators have not spent and will not
spend the time and money to respond to the problem without gov-
ernmental intervention. Yet this does not mean that the govern-
ment alone must clean up the majority of the waste sites in the
country. To the contrary, such efforts are quite often more costly,
more time-consuming, and more likely to diminish the culpable
parties' responsibility for cleaning up the messes they create. Thus,
CERCLA now favors the increased utilization of private cleanups.
However, to fulfill its obligation to protect the environment
and the public health, the government must supervise these pri-
vate efforts. Congress identified several laudable reasons for in-
" For example, despite Rep. Florio's vehement attack on the EPA's past history of
obstruction and inaction, see Florio, 3 Yale J. Reg. at 351-67 (cited in note 17), the agency
practices that he condemns all occurred prior to early 1985.
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cluding a new provision in CERCLA requiring that all remedial
agreements forcing industry polluters to clean up a hazardous
waste site be entered as consent decrees. It hoped (1) to prevent
the EPA from entering into sweetheart deals with industry repre-
sentatives; (2) to reduce litigation; and (3) to ensure as much as
possible that responsible parties would pay for the costs of remov-
ing the hazardous wastes they produced, rather than the EPA and
ultimately the public.
Congress, though, did not sufficiently consider the theoretical
and practical implications of its consent decree framework during
its deliberations. Foisting the supervision of vast numbers of haz-
ardous waste cases onto the courts merely prompts the judiciary to
abandon its adjudicatory function for a managerial one instead. It
imposes undue administrative burdens upon a system unequipped
to handle them, and it creates unrealistic expectations of the judi-
ciary as the source of solutions to a host of politically charged
problems.
In addition, the mandatory use of consent decrees, when com-
bined with the numerous non-judicial checks on the CERCLA en-
forcement process, only serves to delay the initiation of cleanups.
It not only subverts Congress' original goals in including the provi-
sion within CERCLA, but leads in quite the opposite direction-to
increased administrative costs, less uniform hazardous waste poli-
cies, less judicial oversight, decreased private responsibility for
conducting cleanups, and therefore less protection of the public in-
terest in the process.
Bifurcating the process of toxic waste removal into two sepa-
rate phases-one for surface cleanup, and one for underground
cleanup-should eliminate some of the problems created by the
current statutory scheme. Bifurcation would allow the EPA to ex-
pedite enforcement when faced with an immediate threat to the
environment, yet conduct more thoughtful and effective remedial
action for the lengthier and more costly ordeal of decontaminating
subsurface soil and aquifers.
Neither the legislature nor the courts should be the sole bear-
ers of the burden of hazardous waste enforcement. Through SARA,
Congress attempted to provide a workable solution to counteract
the excessive influence exercised by private industry polluters in
the past, but simply was overeager in so doing. The theoretical
consequences of Congress' regulatory program are presently sub-
ject to examination. The practical effects will become more appar-
ent in the future. By all indications, however, Congress may even-
tually be forced to grant the EPA more flexibility in its approach
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to the federal Superfund enforcement process, and may be forced
to do so especially in the area of surface hazardous waste control
management.
Beth I. Z. Boland
